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There are two main frameworks for analyzing cryptographic systems; the symbolic frame-
work, originating from the work of Dolev and Yao, and the computational approach, growing
out of the work of Goldwasser and Micali. A signiﬁcant amount of eﬀort has been made in
order to link both approaches and proﬁt from the advantages of each of them. Indeed, while the
symbolic approach is more amenable to automated proof methods, the computation approach
can be more realistic. Abadi and Rogaway were the ﬁrst to prove a formal link between these
two models. More precisely, they introduced an equivalence relation on terms and prove that
equivalent terms correspond to indistinguishable distributions ensembles, when interpreted
in the computational model. The work of Abadi and Rogaway has been extended to active
adversaries and various cryptographic primitives.
Related works. A recently emerging branch of relating symbolic and computational mod-
els for passive adversaries is based on static equivalence from π-calculus, induced by an equa-
tional theory. Equational theories provide a framework to specify algebraic properties of the
underlying signature, and hence, symbolic computations in a similar way as for abstract data
types. That is, for a ﬁxed equational theory, a term describes a computation in the symbolic
model. Thus, an adversary can distinguish two frames (which roughly speaking are tuples of
terms), if he is able to come up with two computations that yield the same result when applied
to one frame, but diﬀerent results when applied to the other frame. Such a pair of terms is
called a test. Thus, a static equivalence relation is fully determined by the underlying equational
theory, as two frames are statically equivalent, if there is no test that separates them. Baudet,
Cortier and Kremer studied soundness and faithfulness of static equivalence for general equa-
tional theories and used their framework to prove soundness of exclusive or as well as certain
symmetric encryptions. Abadi et al. used static equivalence to analyze guessing attacks.
Recently, Bana, Mohassel and Stegers argued that even though static equivalence works well
to obtain soundness results for the equational theories mentioned above, it does not work well
in other important cases. Consider for instance the Decisional Diﬃe Hellman assumption (DDH
for short) that states that the tuples (g, ga, gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc), where a, b, c are randomly
sampled, are indistinguishable. It does not seem to be obvious to come up with an equational
theory for group exponentiation such that the induced static equivalence includes this pair
of tuples without including others whose computational indistinguishability is not proved to
be a consequence of the DDH assumption. The static equivalence induced by the standard
equational theory for group exponentiation includes the pair (g, ga, gb, ga
2b) and (g, ga, gb, gc).
It is unknown whether the computational indistinguishability of these two distributions can
be proved under the DDH assumption. Therefore, Bana et al. propose an alternative approach
to build symbolic indistinguishability relations: a formal indistinguishability relation (FIR) is
deﬁned as a closure of an initial set of equivalent frames with respect to simple operations
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8which correspond to steps in proofs by reduction. This leads to a ﬂexible symbolic equivalence
relation. In order to prove soundness of a FIR it is enough to prove soundness of the initial set
of equivalences. Moreover, static equivalence is one instance of a FIR.
Contributions. In this paper, we extend Bana et al.’s approach by introducing a notion
of symbolic equivalence that allows us to prove computational security of encryption schemes
symbolically. More speciﬁcally, we would like to be able to treat generic encryption schemes that
transform one-way functions to IND-CPA secure encryption schemes. Therefore, three problems
need to be solved. First, we need to cope with one-way functions. This is another example where
static equivalence does not seem to be appropriate. It does not seem easy to come with a set
of equations that capture the one-wayness of a function. Indeed, consider the term f(a|b),
where f is a one-way function and | is bit-string concatenation. We know that we cannot
easily compute a|b given f(a|b) for uniformly sampled a and b. However, nothing prevents us
from being able to compute a for instance. Introducing equations that allow us to compute a
from f(a|b), e.g., g(f(a|b)) = a, may exclude some one-way functions and does not solve the
problem. Nothing prevents us from computing a preﬁx of b, a preﬁx of the preﬁx, etc . . . . The
second problem that needs to be solved is related to the fact that almost all practical provably
secure encryption schemes are analyzed in the random oracle model. The random oracle model
is an idealized model in which hash functions are randomly sampled functions. In this model,
adversaries have oracle access to these functions. An important property is that if an adversary
is unable to compute the value of an expression a and if H(a) has not been leaked behore, then
H(a) looks like a uniformly sampled value. Thus, we need to be able to symbolically prove that
a value of a given expression a cannot be computed by any adversary. This is sometimes called
weak secrecy in contrast to indistinguishability based secrecy. To cope with this problem, our
notion of symbolic indistinguishability comes along with a non-derivability symbolic relation.
Thus in our approach, we start from an initial pair of a non-derivability relation and a frame
equivalence relation. Then, we provide rules that deﬁne a closure of this pair of relations in
the spirit of Bana et al.’s work. Also in our case, we prove that computational soundness
of the obtained relations can be checked by checking computational soundness of the initial
relations. The third problem is related to the fact that security notions for encryption schemes
such IND-CPA and real-or-random indistinguishability of cipher-text under chosen plaintext
involve active adversaries. Indeed, these security deﬁnitions correspond to two-phase games,
where the adversary ﬁrst computes a value, then a challenge is produced, then the adversary
tries to solve the challenge. Static equivalence and FIR (as deﬁned in by Bana et all.) consider
only passive adversaries. To solve this problem we consider frames that include variables that
correspond to adversaries. As frames are ﬁnite terms, we only have ﬁnitely many such variables.
This is the reason why we only have a degenerate form of active adversaries which is enough
to treat security of encryption schemes and digital signature, for instance. The advantage of
deﬁning non-deductibility as we did, and of considering FIR (instead of static equivalence) as
the good abstraction of indistinguishability, is that ﬁrst, we capture “just” what is supposed
to be true in the computational setting, and second, if we add more equations to our abstract
algebra in a coherent manner with respect to the initial computational assumptions, then
our proofs still remain computationally sound. Moreover, the closure rules we propose in our
framework are designed with the objective of minimizing the initial relations which depend
on the underlying cryptographic primitives and assumptions. We illustrate our framework by
proving IND-CPA security of the constructions of Bellare-Rogaway, Hash El Gamal and an
encryption scheme proposed by Pointcheval.
